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I. INTRODUCTION
Defined as “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process [by
asserting] jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal rights, rather than merely over
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property interests,”1 personal jurisdiction, or “in personam” jurisdiction, and its
broadly interpreted principles have consistently proven to be a muddy field for
courts within the United States. Even more complicated is the application of these
principles to foreign defendants. From the mid-nineteenth century decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff2 to the more recent International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3
defendants have been subject to a variety of tests and criteria for determining the
most critical of questions in a judicial dispute: where can I be required to litigate?
An inquiry into current personal jurisdiction case law results in a fairly
standardized procedure for establishing a forum within the U.S. in contract disputes.
Forum selection clauses, while occasionally held to be unconscionable, have proven
useful in a variety of industries.4 Additionally, modern tests determining whether
sufficient “minimum contacts” exist with a particular state have invariably been
upheld as authoritative.5 While the involvement of corporations as parties to a suit
†

J.D. Candidate, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Class of
2012. The author wishes to thank her family and friends for their unwavering support, and
Professor Susan J. Becker for her essential guidance and encouragement throughout the
writing process.
1

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (8th ed. 2005).

2

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).

3

International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

4
There are several methods for determining the enforceability of forum selection clauses,
though the Federal District Court in Rhode Island has instituted a nine-factor test for assessing
reasonableness:

1. The identity of the law which governs the construction of the contract;
2. The place of execution of the contract(s);
3. The place where the transactions have been or are to be performed;
4. The availability of remedies in the designated forum;
5. The public policy of the initial forum state;
6. The location of the parties, the convenience of prospective witnesses, and the
accessibility of evidence;
7. The relative bargaining power of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their
dealings;
8. The presence or absence of fraud, undue influence or other extenuating (or exacerbating)
circumstances; and
9. The conduct of the parties.
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, at 712 (D.R.I. 1983).
For the purposes of this paper, those situations in which forums selection clauses apply to ecommerce transactions are not considered. This paper focuses instead on contractual
situations where forum selection clauses did not exist in the agreement or were held to be
unconscionable.
5

See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See infra p. 6 (explanation of the “minimum
contacts” test).
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instead of individuals leaves an arbiter with a slightly more varied array of
outcomes, forum selection may eventually be settled using “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”6 Most importantly, states have adopted long-arm
statutes, allowing courts to acquire jurisdiction over anyone who conducts business
within that state. Federal procedures for assessing personal jurisdiction also rely
heavily upon these state statutes.
In cases involving international defendants, a variety of bases have been deemed
appropriate for a U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction, including nationality, 7
domicile,8 “purposeful availment,”9 and a number of federal statutes.10
With the explosion of the Internet and the resulting expansion of international
business transactions via the Web, courts have struggled to adapt traditional modes
of adjudication consistent with established common, statutory and international law.
Internet transactions—now known as e-commerce—involve the “practice of buying
and selling goods and services through online consumer services on the Internet.” 11
In a sphere of commerce apparently limitless in its reach, this article explores the
modern abyss of personal jurisdiction in e-commerce disputes. An analysis leads to
the following proposal: the U.S. should adopt a federal long-arm statute that includes
an e-commerce provision, allowing courts to effectively and systematically evaluate
the propriety of personal jurisdiction in Internet commerce disputes. The new statute
would apply in international cases between the U.S. and its contracting partner states
to bolster the effectiveness of the long-arm statute provisions on personal
jurisdiction in e-commerce.
To reach this conclusion, an analysis of modern personal jurisdiction is
necessary. Section II of this article provides a history of personal jurisdiction in
contract cases within the U.S. and outside its boundaries, including traditional
methods for resolving disputes and the status of current state long-arm statutes.
Section II also addresses issues of cyberspace, including common forms of Internet
contracting and the resulting discord arising out of a lack of uniform treatment
among e-commerce disputes. Finally, this section takes into account previously
published scholarly opinions on the subject of e-commerce and personal jurisdiction.
6

See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. “Traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” is more clearly explained in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws:
“No rule will be adopted initially unless it is in accord with contemporary views of what is fair
and just. So, subject to exceptions stemming from the third factor to be mentioned, a state will
lack jurisdiction to try a case in its courts if the advantages which trial in the state would
afford one party are greatly outweighed by the hardship and inconvenience which would be
suffered by the other.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1988).
7

See infra note 63 for a discussion of nationality.

8

See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (holding that “[d]omicile in [a] state is
alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”). See also
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §11(1) (1988) (“Domicile is a place,
usually a person's home, to which the rules of Conflict of Laws sometimes accord
determinative significance because of the person's identification with that place.”).
9

See infra p.11 for a discussion of purposeful availment.

10

See infra note 87 for a discussion of federal statutes.

11

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 434 (8th ed. 2005).
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In examining these various proposals for a remodeled system, the ultimate
conclusion reached is that acceptance of a newly formulated federal long-arm statute
and its further application to e-commerce disputes provides the most effective way to
resolve this highly complicated problem. Therefore, Section III offers an argument
for the adoption of a federal long-arm statute, providing a model statute, explaining
its terminology, and showing its international significance.
II. BACKGROUND
United States courts generally categorize judicial jurisdiction in three ways: those
circumstances in which power is asserted based on an individual's person or assets
(in personam, or personal jurisdiction), those looking to previous claims of interest
in specific pieces of property (in rem jurisdiction), or occasions in which an
individual attempts to take property as collateral for a pending, unrelated claim
involving the owner of that property (quasi in rem jurisdiction).12 Though any of
these three jurisdictional bases may apply in a given business context, this paper
focuses on personal jurisdiction as it relates to the adjudication of contractual
relationships made internationally through e-commerce.
In the realm of e-commerce, there are two basic contractual forms: business-tobusiness and business-to-consumer.13 Business-to-business contracts include
vertically and horizontally integrated markets with businesses buying from and
selling to each other.14 Business-to-consumer contracts, on the other hand, involve
the seller of a good or service bringing the contracted thing directly to the consumer,
each deriving benefit from the transaction through an exchange of goods or services
and money.15
For the purposes of this paper, a focus on business-to-consumer contracts will be
most constructive, this being the relationship that leads to litigation more often than
associations between two businesses. To give this concept weight, especially in the
sphere of international business, consider the following scenario: Seller (S)
manufactures widgets in his home country of France and advertises them globally
through ads circulating various websites. Buyer (B), an individual living in the U.S.,
is interested in purchasing some of these widgets. Through an electronic agreement
(meaning a contract conducted over the Internet, accompanied by party’s electronic
signature16), B contracts to buy several widgets. However, when they arrive, they
are defective and do not suit B’s intended purpose. The question is, may B
successfully bring S to court in the U.S. to recover his losses? Do factors such as S’s
advertising strategy through the Web affect the outcome? This paper helps to
answer these questions, describing the standards involved in adjudicating with
foreign defendants where personal jurisdiction over the defendant is made
appropriate by the formation of an e-commerce relationship.
12

See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 28 (2d ed. 1994).
13

E-COMMERCE LAW & BUSINESS § 1.02[A], at 1-5 (Mark E. Plotkin, ed. 2003).

14

See id. § 1.02[A][1], at 1-5.

15

See id. § 1.02[A][2], at 1-9.

16

IN

UNITED

Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN), Pub. L. No. 106229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.).
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To accurately depict the way in which current personal jurisdiction in the U.S.
evolved—domestically and internationally—a historical account of this area of law
is necessary.
A. The Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction in the United States
Traditionally, a court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction in the U.S. required the
physical presence of the defendant to a suit in the forum state. 17 This geographybound prerequisite became impractical with the expansion of interstate commerce in
the early Twentieth Century, forcing courts to consider cases in which contractual
parties were not invariably immediate neighbors. Courts allowed a substantial
degree of physical separation between parties, while attempting to safeguard a
defendant's rights. The resulting personal jurisdiction standards placed greater
emphasis on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,18 but no longer required a defendant to be physically present
within a jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction to be appropriate.19
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1945, significantly changed personal jurisdiction law. 20 International Shoe involved
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. 21
Though the company did not have any offices or make sales contracts in the state of
Washington, several of the companies’ salesmen resided there. 22 The state of
Washington brought suit against International Shoe in state court, arguing that the
company had made itself amenable to Washington courts by selling shoes there but
failing to contribute to the state unemployment compensation fund. 23 International
Shoe argued that Washington courts lacked jurisdiction over the company and its
salesmen because its activities within that state were insufficient to constitute a
“presence” there.24 In resolving this dispute, the Supreme Court announced the
introduction of the “minimum contacts” test, stating that:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
17
See generally Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720. As illustrated in this seminal case, Nineteenth
Century courts believed that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established.” Id.
18

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

19

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these
circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the
forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's
affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for
physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.”).
20

See generally International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

21

Id. at 313-14.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 314-15.

24

Id. at 315.
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forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’25
The court reasoned that, if the defendant enjoyed protections afforded by the laws of
a particular state during the course of business, and especially if the defendant was
able to manipulate the laws of that state to further the defendant's own contractual
rights, the state had the prerogative to execute its laws against that individual. 26 In
this case, because International Shoe had rendered itself amenable to the Washington
courts because of the activities of its salesmen in that State, personal jurisdiction
over it was proper.27 As a result of the International Shoe decision, courts find that
adjudicatory proceedings subjecting an out-of-state defendant to a particular state's
laws comply with due process considerations where that defendant has had
systematic and continuous contacts with a forum state. 28 This test, however, did not
impart a bright-line application.
The 1980s also brought greater illumination to those still shadowy corners of
personal jurisdiction by asking courts to consider whether a defendant has contacts
and conducted themselves in such a way as to “reasonably anticipate being haled
into court” in the forum state. 29 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the
Robinsons, a family that bought a car from a New York car retailer, were driving
through Oklahoma when their car was struck, resulting in severe injuries to several
family members.30 The Robinsons brought a products-liability suit in an Oklahoma
court against the New York retailer, the importer of the car, and the car’s
manufacturer, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.31 The defendant retailer argued that
because it did not have minimum contacts with the state of Oklahoma, being forced
to litigate there violated its due process rights.32 The Supreme Court reasoned that
if personal jurisdiction were to be asserted on the basis of minimum contacts, it
should also consider a defendant's objective knowledge of the terms of the contract
he or she signs.33 In doing so, potential defendants would be more cognizant as to
whether they might be held liable in a particular jurisdiction. By looking to the
nature and frequency of his or her contact with a state, a party to a contract can more
aptly predict whether the laws of that state apply to them, and are thus given fair
warning of the potential for a lawsuit and assured of all necessary due process
rights.34 In this instance, because there was no evidence that any other cars sold by
25

Id. at 316.

26

See id.

27

See id. at 321.

28

See id. at 320.

29

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

30

Id. at 495-96.

31

Id.

32

See id.

33

See id.

34

See id.
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the retailer ever entered Oklahoma, the Court agreed that assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the retailer violated its due process rights.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz further clarified this standard of review. 35 In
this case, the defendants opened a Burger King franchise in their home state of
Michigan, the contracts establishing the franchise providing that the laws of the
home state of Burger King, Florida, would govern. 36 Burger King eventually chose
to terminate the franchise when business slowed, but the defendants refused to close
the restaurant.37 Burger King brought an action against the defendants in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging breach of franchise
obligations.38 The Supreme Court held that assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute was valid.39 Here, the
defendants had derived substantial benefits from their association with a major
national restaurant chain and, moreover, that the defendants had voluntarily entered
into a “long-term and exacting regulation” of their business from Burger King’s
headquarters in Florida.40 Since the defendants had established such a substantial
and continuing relationship with that Corporation’s offices, and because the
franchise contract presumed that litigation in Florida was probable, the Court held
that the defendants’ due process rights were not infringed by being forced to litigate
there.41
In deciding Burger King, the Court explained that “it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”42 Consequently, a defendant cannot be forced to litigate in a
state where the defendant only had random or attenuated contacts.43 Only where the
defendant has contacts with the forum state that “proximately result” from actions of
the defendant is personal jurisdiction proper.44
With evolutions in the status of personal jurisdiction, courts have been given
more specific, but still highly elastic, standards by which to analyze forum selection
within the U.S. Still, almost nothing has proved more valuable than the introduction
of long-arm statutes, which continue the tradition of considering “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”45 This legal creation is, more often than not, the
basis for a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction today.

35

See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 465-66.

36

See id.

37

Id. at 468.

38

Id. at 468–69.

39

Id. at 487.

40

Id. at 479-488.

41

See id. at 487.

42

Id. at 475.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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B. State Long-Arm Statutes: The Bedrock for Improvement
State long-arm statutes are enacted by individual states to define instances in
which the state court may assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.46
These statutes create a presumption that assertion of personal jurisdiction is
appropriate, though due process analyses are still necessary on a case-by-base basis
to protect the Constitutional rights of defendants. The first state long-arm statute
was adopted by Illinois in 1955, following International Shoe, and by 1963 each of
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had
adopted some method for asserting jurisdiction over nonresidents. 47

46

See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 4-3 (1983). Because Congress
has not enacted a federal version of the state long-arm statute, Rule Four of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure enables federal courts to borrow long-arm statutes of the states in which
federal courts are located: “[u]nless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than
a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a
judicial district of the United States by: (1) following state law for serving a summons in an
action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or
where service is made.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1). See infra pp. 21-25 for an argument as to
why a federal long-arm statute should be adopted.
47
CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-3. In addition to several states adopting their own statutes,
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted a model state long-arm statute under the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act in 1963. Id. This statue, similar to the one
I propose in its breadth, reads as follows:

§ 1.02. [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Enduring Relationship].
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized
under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this state as
to any [cause of action] [claim for relief].
§ 1.03. [Personal Jurisdiction Based on Conduct].
1)

2)

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's
a)

transacting any business in this state;

b)

contracting to supply services or things in this state;

c)

causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;

d)

causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state; [or]

e)

having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state ; [or]

f)

contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the
time of contracting].

When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a [cause of action]
[claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him.
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1. Types of Long-Arm Statutes
There are three basic approaches to state long-arm statutes. The first, adopted by
states such as California and Nevada, are simple and broad.48 They provide for the
power to assert jurisdiction over an individual or corporation so long as that
jurisdiction meets due process requirements.49 The second type usually provides a
brief enumerated list of those situations likely to satisfy the “minimum contacts”
test. Texas and New York have adopted this form, covering basic business
transactions and tortious conduct involving defendants that may result in litigation
with nonresidents.50 The final type of long-arm statute lists, in detail, the situations
48
CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-6. See generally Long-Arm Statutes: A Fifty State Survey,
VEDDER PRICE (2003), http://www.vedderprice.com/docs/pub/64a3d50f-1bf1-4b7d-a2386b76933afa53_document.pdf. Other states that provide this basic form of long-arm statutes
include Wyoming and Rhode Island. Id.
49
Id. As an example of this statutory form, California’s long-arm statute reads as follows:
“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States.” CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (2011).
50

CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-4. See generally Long-Arm Statutes, supra note 48. States
that follow long-arm statutes like that found in New York include: Connecticut, Georgia,
Minnesota, and New Hampshire. Id.
As an example of this statutory form, New York’s long-arm statute reads as follows:
§ 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any
of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through
an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply
goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matrimonial actions or
family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial action or family court
proceeding involving a demand for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive
awards or special relief in matrimonial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction
over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is
a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if
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in which a state court may assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
These statutes, such as the ones found in Ohio and Kentucky, list various forms of
business transactions, tortious conduct, usage of personal property, and similar
activity by a defendant that may result in a lawsuit over which the state has
jurisdiction.51
the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such
demand is made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties
before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the
claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in
matrimonial actions accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement
executed in this state. The family court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident respondent to the extent provided in sections one hundred fifty-four
and one thousand thirty-six and article five-B of the family court act and article fiveA of the domestic relations law.
(c) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this
section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of
action not arising from an act enumerated in this section.
(d) Foreign defamation judgment. The courts of this state shall have personal
jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding
outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New York or is a
person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets in New York
or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the judgment, for the
purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that person's liability for the
judgment, and/or for the purpose of determining whether said judgment should be
deemed non-recognizable pursuant to section fifty-three hundred four of this
chapter, to the fullest extent permitted by the United States constitution, provided:
1. the publication at issue was published in New York, and
2. that resident or person amenable to jurisdiction in New York (i) has
assets in New York which might be used to satisfy the foreign defamation
judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in New York to comply with
the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of this subdivision shall
apply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation proceedings
outside the United States prior to and/or after the effective date of this
subdivision.
N.Y. C.P.L.R., § 302 (McKinney 2011).
51

CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-4. See generally Long-Arm Statutes, supra note 48. Those
states that adopted a lengthy enumerated list include: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
As an example of this statutory form, Ohio’s long-arm statute reads as follows:
§ 2307.382. Personal jurisdiction
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
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2. Due Process Considerations
Because state long-arm statutes have the capability of compelling almost any
individual to litigate in a state if the state court deems its jurisdiction proper, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognizes the importance of due process rights in the application of
the statutes.52 Two types of personal jurisdiction exist in the United States: general
and specific.53 General personal jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any claim
against a defendant where the defendant has had a sufficient degree of continuous

(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this state;
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or
impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably
have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state,
provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in this state;
(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state
committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have
expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state;
(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of which
takes place in this state, which he commits or in the commission of which he is
guilty of complicity.
(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;
(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting.
(B) For purposes of this section, a person who enters into an agreement, as a
principal, with a sales representative for the solicitation of orders in this state is
transacting business in this state. As used in this division, "principal" and "sales
representative" have the same meanings as in section 1335.11 of the Revised Code.
(C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause
of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (2011).
52
See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-1163 (1966) (describing
situations in which assertion of personal jurisdiction (specific and general) may place undue
burden on defendants) [hereinafter von Mehren]. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that a Texas court lacked personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation because a representative of the corporation did not have
sufficient continuous and systematic contacts to satisfy due process requirements); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that a state court has authority to assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that person committed intentional, tortious acts
aimed directly at the forum state).
53

See von Mehren, supra note 52, at 1136.
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and systematic contacts with the forum state.54 Once this type of jurisdiction has
been established, that court may hear any claim against the defendant, whether or not
it is related to the action that has arisen out of the forum state. 55 Specific personal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, only permits adjudication of claims that are related to
or arise out of a defendant's contacts with the forum state.
Differentiating between “general” or “specific” jurisdiction provides an
additional safeguard in protecting a defendant's due process rights, limiting the
extent to which a state court may litigate a matter. In distinguishing the nature of a
claim in this way, the hope is that the defendant will not be unduly burdened by
being haled into a forum state with which he or she has not had sufficient contact.
Specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper where the contract in
dispute had a “substantial connection” with the forum state, 56 while assertion of
general personal jurisdiction requires a showing that there were continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum state.57 Looking at claims in this way is a crucial
aspect of providing fair proceedings, especially when the source and effects of a
particular action are difficult to pinpoint, as in e-commerce transactions.
Regardless of whether the personal jurisdiction is specific or general, a defendant
must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state, 58 indicating that the
defendant could reasonably expect to be “haled into court” in that state 59 and it must
be shown that adjudication against the defendant in that forum does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”60
C. International Personal Jurisdiction
The previously discussed standards for asserting personal jurisdiction over
defendants in litigation between U.S. citizens also apply to cases in which a U.S.
court attempts to assert personal jurisdiction over an international defendant.
Notwithstanding variations in form, the basic concept is the same: assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant cannot violate due process requirements of
the U.S. Constitution, nor violate current international treaties. 61 Distinguishing
between general and specific personal jurisdiction is a critical part of the analysis in
such cases.62

54
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. See generally Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was appropriate
where the defendant Mining Company continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
state in the form of business meetings, payment of salaries, and stock transfers).
55

See BORN, supra note 12, at 34.

56

von Mehren, supra note 52, at 1149-50.

57

See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION
generally Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783.

AND

58

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

59

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

60

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

61

See generally BORN, supra note 12, at 35.

62

See generally BORN, supra note 12, at 35-95.

FORUM SELECTION § 4.09 (1988).
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1. General Personal Jurisdiction
To assert general personal jurisdiction over an international defendant and
successfully litigate a dispute with a foreign defendant, the U.S. court must prove
that it has jurisdiction based on one of three broad categories: (1) that the
individual’s nationality,63 domicile,64 residence,65 or, if a business, its incorporation
status,66 exposed the foreign defendant to the laws of the U.S.; (2) that the defendant
had continuous and systematic activities within the forum such that it is subject to
litigation in the U.S.;67 or (3) that the “transitory presence” of the defendant within
the forum makes personal jurisdiction possible. 68
There are obvious benefits and detriments that arise out of the use of these
criteria as a basis for general personal jurisdiction. For example, though these
conditions were put into place to make litigation procedures with foreign defendants
more efficient and fair, it is quite possible that even a U.S. citizen residing in a
foreign nation might complain that being forced to adjudicate within the U.S. is
burdensome, requiring extensive travel and expense. 69 Corporations that have been
obliged to litigate in a U.S. forum commonly argue that contracting in an open
market makes the corporation liable to litigation virtually anywhere its goods are to
63

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§421(2)(d) (stating that “a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person
or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted . . . the person, if a natural person,
is a national of the state”). See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (holding
that a nation such as the United States could require one of its citizens, who was then traveling
in France, to return to it to be charged or to litigate a claim because he was a national of the
U.S.).
64

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

65

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971). Comment (a)
provides factors to be considered in determining whether jurisdiction based on residency is
proper, including “(1) the amount of time the individual spends in the state, (2) the nature of
his place of abode in the state, (3) his attitude of mind toward the state, as for example,
whether he regards it with affection and as a place to which he likes to go whenever possible,
and (4) the things he does in the state.” Id.
Residency as a basis for personal jurisdiction can be particularly problematic in an
international dispute, especially when based on an Internet case. For example, in National
Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp. (iCraveTV.com), a Canadian corporation that offered
pirated TV programs over the Internet was sued for copyright infringement by a U.S. plaintiff
hoping to utilize U.S. laws in the litigation. Personal jurisdiction over the Defendant was
accomplished by serving the Defendant’s sales manager who happened to reside and work for
the corporation in Pennsylvania.
Natl. Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp.
(iCraveTV.com), 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831, 1834 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
66

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42. See also Perkins,
342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783.
67

See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783.

68

See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (holding that personal
jurisdiction may be properly asserted over a defendant solely on the basis of service of process
while a defendant is temporarily physically present in the forum state). See also
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28.
69

See Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421.
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be found, and that the “continuous and systematic activities” test is therefore
insufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 70
Other nations also differ greatly from the U.S. on the subject of “transitory
presence” or “tag service.” This form of service renders a foreign defendant subject
to litigation in any U.S. jurisdiction so long as the defendant is properly served with
process in the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff seeks a remedy. 71 Though the U.S.
recognizes “tag service” as appropriate, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters provided a forum for
nations like Ireland and the U.K. to disagree, voicing their refusal to recognize the
transitory presence of a defendant within a jurisdiction as a basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction.72 There is a concern amongst those nations that “transient”
jurisdiction violates customary international law, so U.S. courts have made some
efforts to comply with those broadly accepted standards, 73 albeit inconsistently.
2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
For a U.S. court to assert specific personal jurisdiction in an international case,
due process necessitates that the foreign defendant “purposefully availed” himself of
the laws and protections of the U.S., that the defendant’s contacts with the state gave
rise to the litigation, and that forcing the defendant to litigate in the U.S. is
objectively reasonable.74 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of this
70
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See infra
pp. 11-12. In Asahi, the Supreme Court of California held that due process requires that a
“substantial connection” be made between the defendant and the forum State which satisfies
minimum contacts, and this must come about “by an action of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 104. Therefore, mere placement of a product in the
stream of commerce is insufficient to meet minimum contacts. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court,
though it ultimately reversed the order of the Superior Court of California, agreed that due
process requires a substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state. See id. at
112. However, it further clarified this standard, holding that “the substantial connection . . .
between the defendant and the forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state”
(emphasis by the Court). Id.

U.S. federal courts in international disputes face the issue of whether to apply a “national
contacts” test or a “state contacts” test. See generally 2 E-COMMERCE LAW AND BUSINESS
(Mark E Plotkin, Bert Wells, and Kurt Wimmer eds., 2003). Though federal courts are limited
by the Fifth Amendment in their exercise of personal jurisdiction, federal statues will often
incorporate language allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based
on the defendant’s contacts with the U.S. as a whole, and not simply within one state in the
U.S. (where it otherwise may not have been allowed to assert jurisdiction because of
insufficient contacts within that single district). Id.
71

Fisher, Brown & Co. vs. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104 (1895).

72

Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, art. 3, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 8 I.L.M. 229, 232 (1969), as
amended by 1990 O.J. (L 189) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990), reprinted in 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1
[hereinafter Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction].
73

See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 876 n.207 (1997).
74

See generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.
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reasonableness standard in its decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court.75 Asahi, a Japanese corporation, manufactured tire valve assemblies and sold
the assemblies to Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation that manufactured tire
tubes.76 Approximately twenty percent of the Cheng Shin tire tubes sold in the U.S.
were available in California, but following a fatal accident in that State that was
attributed to alleged defects in the tire tubes, a products liability action was initiated
against Asahi. Asahi argued that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts within
the State for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Company, and the Supreme
Courted held:
The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a state court's
assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant will differ from case to
case. In every case, however, those interests, as well as the Federal
Government's interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best served
by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction
in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on
an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the
plaintiff or the forum State. 77
The Court found that because Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of activities
within the State of California, it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
State, making personal jurisdiction over the Company impermissible. 78
Internationally, there are still concerns as to the appropriateness of specific
personal jurisdiction under the Asahi guidelines. Unease often centers on issues of
convenience, differences in procedural and substantive laws among nations,
differences in political and social values, and the potential for interference with the
sovereignty of other states.79 Justice Harlan appropriately noted the importance of
keeping a rational, unselfish perspective of the rights of the U.S. to impose its own
specialized interests in international disputes.80 He advised in United States v. First
National City Bank that “[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” 81
3. Alternative Means of Asserting Personal Jurisdiction in International Cases
Though the previous methods of asserting personal jurisdiction often apply in
state courts, federal courts in the U.S. also have specialized means for establishing
the right to adjudicate claims against a foreign defendant. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(f), unless there is a federal statute mandating a specific course
of action, individuals in foreign countries may be served by a U.S. plaintiff where
75

Asahi, 480 U.S. 102.

76

Id. at 106-07.

77

Id. at 115.

78

Id. at 115-116.

79

See BORN, supra note 12, at 78.

80

United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
81

Id.
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there is an internationally agreed upon means for service, reasonably calculated so as
to give notice to the defendant.82 The Rule provides for assertion of personal
jurisdiction under unique circumstances where jurisdiction over a party concerning a
federal claim meets due process qualifications but has no basis under federal or state
law.83 The Rule explicitly references the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents as one of these agreements, which applies
“in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or
extrajudicial document for service abroad.”84 Therefore, any of the member states to
the agreement may assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant through the
Convention's mechanisms for providing service of process. 85 On the other hand,
Rule 4 also states that if there is no international standard, personal jurisdiction may
be accomplished by serving a foreign defendant according to the laws of that
nation.86 This does not preclude a defendant from challenging the constitutionality
of a personal jurisdiction claim, but with these methods, there is a greater chance that
two nations may agree on how personal jurisdiction is to be asserted in an
international case.
The federal government also attempts to gain transparency and predictability in
international arenas by providing personal jurisdiction provisions into federal
statutes, such as the Clayton Act governing antitrust law. 87 These are especially
helpful in adjudicating international cases because the terms supply specific
provisions allowing for “world-wide” service of process where the defendant
“transacts business” or anywhere that the defendant “may be found.” 88 Not only
does this aid U.S. courts in justifying assertion of personal jurisdiction in difficult
scenarios, but it also puts foreign defendants on notice of the circumstances through
which they may be forced to adjudicate within the U.S. As a practical matter,
because statutes like the Clayton Act work in conjunction with Federal Rule 4(k),
which mandates that exercise of jurisdiction be consistent with the U.S. Constitution,
a due process analysis is still necessary to determine whether assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant meets with fundamental fairness requirements. 89 It is

82

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(f)(1).

83

DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFREY L. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY § 6.03, at 6-12 (3d ed. 2007).

TO

84

Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters art. 1, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 656 U.N.T.S. 163.
85

See id.

86

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(f)(2).

87

See BORN, supra note 12, at 99-100. Statutes such as the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §22
(1982), and the federal securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§77v, 78aa (1982), allow for “world-wide”
service of process, while statutes such as RICO, 18 U.S.C. §1965 (1982), only permit “nationwide” service of process within the U.S. Id.
88
89

Id.

See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(k)(2)(B). See also Adam B. Perry, Note, Which Cases are
“Such Cases”: Interpreting and Applying Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1177, 1188 (2007).
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generally acknowledged, however, that personal jurisdiction is proper so long as the
defendant has sufficient aggregate contacts with the U.S. as a whole. 90
Though these guidelines generally assist courts, personal jurisdiction law is still
controversial when applied internationally. Ultimately, these statutes and rules fail
to provide predictability because there is little to no communication on the subject of
personal jurisdiction with foreign nations, and no set standards for a consistent
method of jurisdictional procedure. What further complicates these issues is that
personal jurisdiction law as we know it is now being imposed upon by a new giant of
industry: the Internet.
D. E-Commerce: Contracting through the Internet
The explosion of popularity surrounding the use of the Internet is evident in the
daily lives of most of the world's citizens as well as the economic census data
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. 91 A history of the growth in U.S.
manufacturing shows that e-commerce shipment values practically tripled from 2003
to 2008, and that the total value of manufactured items sold through e-commerce
(calculated in millions of dollars) is now almost equal to the dollar amount
representing items sold through traditional trading methods. 92 Considering that this
census data is already two years old as of the date of this paper, it is likely that ecommerce enterprises have matched, or even exceeded, conventional manufacturing
and trade transactions.
As big as e-commerce is in the U.S., international transactions are even greater in
comparison. Currently, Western Europe commands the number one spot in retail ecommerce transactions with online retail sales predicted to exceed $200 billion in
2012.93 The People’s Republic of China (China) is also a contributor, boasting a 22
percent increase in e-commerce transactions from 2009 to 2010, and yielding 4.5
trillion yuan ($682.16 billion) in profits.94 Japan, though riding somewhat in the
wake of most of the world’s retail giants, has also taken advantage of the Internet. 95
Reports maintain that revenues acquired from online sales have increased each year
by approximately 17 percent since 2005 with expectations of a 10 percent growth
every year for the next five years.96
Before addressing the effects of e-commerce growth and the complications that
arise out of its litigation, it is important to understand the different methods of
Internet contracting.
90

Perry, supra note 89, at 1218.

91
See Annual Survey of Manufactures, and the Economic Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(2008), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2008/historical/2008ht1.pdf.
92

See id.

93

See Karin von Abrams, Retail E-Commerce in Western Europe, EMARKETER (May,
2010), http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Emarketer_2000679.aspx.
94

China's e-commerce transactions exceed 4.5 trillion yuan in 2010, PEOPLE’S DAILY,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7260847.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2011).
95

E-commerce Takes Off in Japan: Up and Away, ECONOMIST, http://www.
economist.com/node/16322651 (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
96

Id.
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1. Types of E-Commerce Transactions and the Problems Resulting from Their Use
There are three main categories of Internet transactions constituting e-commerce:
those agreements with shrinkwrap terms, those with clickwrap terms, and those with
browsewrap terms.97 Shrinkwrap terms are found were a purchaser orders a product
that arrives, usually wrapped in plastic, with the seller's contract terms located
somewhere in the package.98 Clickwrap terms require that the buyer click an “I
agree” button, thereby consenting to the seller's terms, before a sale is completed. 99
Browsewrap terms are the most flexible, providing that a buyer implicitly agrees to
the terms of use on a seller's website without express consent, simply by utilizing the
site.100
In considering each form of e-commerce transaction, it quickly becomes evident
that classic negotiation methods and dispute resolution are not always easily applied
to Internet contracts. A popular complaint is that the terms of the contract are
unconscionable, resulting in a disproportionate amount of bargaining power for the
seller with very little influence for the buyer. 101 Unconscionability is arguably more
widespread in Internet contracts as opposed to traditional form contracts because,
especially in terms of browsewrap transactions, buyers are not on notice that they are
automatically subject to arbitration agreements, since it is unnecessary for them to

97

KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 193
(6th ed. 2007).
For each of the following terms, electronic signatures have been found to be a valid and
enforceable method of agreement to an electronic contract. This has been recognized in such
statutes as E-Sign, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN): 15
U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq. (2000) (signed by President Bill Clinton on June 30, 2000, and
effective Oct. 1, 2000), UETA, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) on July 23,
1999; as of July 2001, 36 states enacted this Act), and in the EU, by the Directive on a
Common Framework for Electronic Signatures. EU: Directive on a Common Framework for
Electronic Signatures, 1999: Directive 199/93/EC of 13 December 1999 on a Community
Framework for Electronic Signatures, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:3199 9L0093:en:HTML.
Additionally the United Nations has approved an approach to e-signatures in the Model Law
on Electronic Signatures by UNCITRAL. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
with
Guide
to
Enactment
2001,
UNCITRAL
(April,
2002),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf.
98
See id. at 193-94. These terms will often include a caveat that the buyer’s failure to
return the item within a specified time period confirms that the buyer agrees to abide by the
seller's terms of use. See id.
99

See id.

100

See id. These terms often appear on the provider's homepage, but it is unnecessary for a
user to make any sign of recognition of or agreement with these terms before they are subject
to them. See id.
101

See generally Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998) (holding an
arbitration clause as unenforceable as a contract of adhesion where buyers of computers
alleged breach of contract (among other things) and had to abide by a terms and conditions
agreement with hardly a response from the manufacturer).
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explicitly consent to terms.102 Courts may also struggle with a “chicken or the egg”
problem: was it the seller who initiated the contact by offering a product or service
over the Internet, or was it the buyer who activated the contract by seeking out the
goods?
The litigation process is further complicated because U.S. and international
courts do not have a uniform method of applying personal jurisdiction to ecommerce disputes. Two courts within a single U.S. state may even hold differently
on a similar matter. For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan held that a website operated by a nonresident, which did not allow users to
make purchases through the home page, but rather promoted sales by providing links
to another site, did not provide sufficient contacts with the state for the court to
assert personal jurisdiction over it.103 In contrast, a case decided just the year before
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in which the
Court held that a nonresident’s website, used to promote sales, did have sufficient
contacts with residents of the forum state for the Court to assert personal
jurisdiction.104 The difference here is slight, resting on the respective websites’ level
of interactivity and how each one sold its products. As a result, contracting parties
lack foreseeability as to how a conflict might be resolved. To address this problem,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania formulated
a “sliding scale” test, currently adopted by many state courts dealing with ecommerce dispute resolution.
2. The Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test
The case of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com involved an Internet domain
name dispute in which the Plaintiff, having its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania, made allegations of trademark dilution and infringement against the
Defendant, a California corporation that operated a Web site. 105 The legal question
was whether Pennsylvania's Long-arm Statute could be used to assert personal
jurisdiction over Zippo DOT Com (the corporation running the Web site) on the
basis that it sold passwords to approximately 3,000 Pennsylvania residents and
entered into seven contracts with Internet providers in Pennsylvania over its course
of operation.106 The court found that because the Defendant did more than simply
advertise its products in Pennsylvania, and because its contacts with the State's
citizens were not fortuitous since it consciously decided to process those users'
requests for services, Zippo DOT Com conducted e-commerce constituting
“purposeful availment” of doing business in Pennsylvania. 107 Specific personal
102

See KNAPP, supra note 97, at 211.

103

Siebellink v. Cyclone Airsports, Ltd., No. 1:01-CV-591, 2001 WL 1910560 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 27, 2001).
104
Sports Authority Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
105

Zippo Mfg. Co. V. Zippo DOT Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121.

106

Id. at 1126.

107

Id. at 1125-27. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (holding that
the cause of action must not have arisen out of fortuitous circumstances for due process
considerations to be satisfied).
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jurisdiction requirements were satisfied in this case, therefore allowing the court to
assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Web site corporation.108
In coming to this conclusion, Zippo set out what has become known as the
“sliding scale” test for determining whether personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant is appropriate in an Internet case. 109 The sliding scale operates as follows:
(1) personal jurisdiction is likely proper where a provider openly carries out business
over the Internet while knowingly and repeatedly transferring files; (2) personal
jurisdiction is probably improper where a provider manages a passive Web site,
merely posting information that becomes available to foreign users; and (3) personal
jurisdiction and its appropriateness is within the discretion of the court, depending
upon the degree to which an interactive Web site engages its users, as well as the
commercial nature of the transaction taking place through the site. 110 This test
provides a framework for analyzing e-commerce cases, the result being a general
improvement in a party's ability to predict the outcome of its Internet contracting
dispute.
3. Problems with Zippo
Even with the guidance the “sliding scale” test provides, there remains a level of
subjectivity in the court's decision that is unsettling. Forum states within the U.S.
still have a tremendous amount of discretion in determining whether personal
jurisdiction is proper, especially in cases involving interactive Web sites. Zippo
asked whether “Dot Com's conducting of electronic commerce with Pennsylvania
residents [constituted] the purposeful availment of doing business in
Pennsylvania.”111 This “purposeful availment” standard is in turn a very elastic one,
requiring courts to consider a corporation or individual's intent in operating a Web
site to determine if that entity wished to do business in the state. 112 Because sites set
up for profit-making purposes normally do not discriminate against customers on the
basis of residence, it is very easy to make a blanket assumption that every site
operator purposefully avails himself to doing business in every state, so long as that
availment results in capital gain.
In cases of international e-commerce transactions, purposeful availment may be
especially difficult to prove. Attempts by member states of the European Union and
the European Free Trade Area to standardize the means to assert personal
jurisdiction—basing requirements on domicile in the absence of a contractual
agreement to do otherwise—113 leaves significant room for conflict. Even with this
108

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126-27.

109
Id. at 1124. The Zippo Court based this test on the presumption that “the likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature
and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Id.
110
Id. As is evidenced by this test, the level of interactivity a Web site requires is a crucial
factor in understanding whether personal jurisdiction is proper over a nonresident defendant.
111

Id. at 1125-26.

112

See id.

113

See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 72, art. 2. See also Council
Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Dec. 22, 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF.
This
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agreement, some consumers may be able to bring suit in their own nation’s courts
for breach of contract despite the fact that their country would traditionally not be
able to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 114 This applies where the
defendant directed attention toward the consumer prior to closing the contract, 115 but,
once again, determining whether a plaintiff was actually targeted or merely stumbled
into the defendant’s broad web of advertising is often difficult to calculate.
It is unfair to subject sellers to this level of awareness and accountability,
especially in an age where linking information produced on an original home page to
another wholly unrelated Web site is so popular. Conversely, operators of many
passive Web sites will not be held liable for harm done when truly at fault, simply
because they hold the trump card of claiming lack of calculated engagement.
Consequently parties to an e-commerce dispute are still left in the dark, struggling to
determine whether or not these many tests (“minimum contacts,” “sliding scale,”
“purposeful availment,” etc.) will result in personal jurisdiction being proper.
E. Scholarly Suggestions and International Proposals
Scholars have offered various suggestions for improving personal jurisdiction
analysis in e-commerce disputes. A discussion of these admirable attempts at
clarification demonstrates that these goals are simply too lofty and impractical.
1. The “ODR” Approach
In his article Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce
Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient and Secure, Fred Galves proposes
implementing Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) to negotiate Internet contract cases,
transforming common Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) by making it available
entirely online.116 He argues that ODR would be a cost-saving, efficient method for
resolving e-commerce disputes, as opposed to traditional litigation and that it would
be an improvement over ADR because it would offer a more efficient and informal
environment for settlement.117 To make the system applicable internationally,
Galves proposes using the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the United Nations
second agreement is significant in that it defines the “place of performance” for all EU
members (with the exception of Denmark) (art. 5(1)(b)), and also states when and where
consumers may sue a seller. See id.
A second proposal was made by the EU Brussels Regulation in 1999 in which the assembly
decided that jurisdiction over passive Internet sites would not be accepted. Proposal for a
Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(1999) 348 final at 16, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0348:FIN:EN:PDF. The Proposal
further states that an online consumer in the EU would be able to bring suit against a Web site
operator regardless of where the site is based or whether the operator has purposefully
targeted the nation where the consumer is domiciled. Id.
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115

See id. art. 13(3)(a).
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(2009).
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Convention for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) as the applicable arbitration
law.118
Though desirable, this approach lacks follow-through. The UCC is not adopted
uniformly by all states.119 Persons operating out of states that have not adopted
various UCC provisions would likely argue issues of fairness. From an international
perspective, one of the most marked problems with using the CISG is that it has not
been uniformly ratified by all member states, including the UK 120 which, as
previously mentioned, makes up a significant percentage of the world’s e-commerce
transactions. Furthermore, the CISG has been criticized for its use of vague
language, such as “fundamental breach” and “reasonable length.” 121
Even if these contentions were immaterial, problems may arise where dispute
resolution is forced upon a contracting party. Although ADR is often provided for
by contract, and although some persons prefer this form of conflict resolution, others
prefer their day in court. A system where parties avoid coming face-to-face may be
disagreeable to those who wish to present evidence in a courtroom instead of
uploading documents to the Web, or to those who desire to cross-examine witnesses
in person instead of over the telephone. The credibility of parties to the dispute or
witnesses is also much more difficult to evaluate when the case is resolved online.
In short, ODR does not address some of the most basic needs of parties to
contemporary contract disputes.
2. The ICC E-Commerce Project
Another suggestion similar to Galves’ ODR approach is offered by the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Fundamental to this proposal is that
there should be more industry self-regulation in e-commerce transactions.122 To
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Id. at 9-10.

119

See generally Uniform Commercial Code Locater, CORNELL (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html.
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As of 2005, the UK had not ratified the CISG, though Lord Sainsbury, the Under
Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry in the House of Lords stated, “the
United Kingdom intends to ratify the convention, subject to the availability of parliamentary
time. There have been delays in the past for a number of reasons, but we propose to issue a
consultation document in the course of the next few months to examine the available options.”
The Hon. Justice James Douglas, Arbitration of the International Sale of Goods Disputes
under the Vienna Convention (2006), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
douglas.html (paper delivered at the Institute of Arbitrator and Mediators Australia National
Conference 2006).
Today, the UK still has not ratified the CISG. The Hon. Justice James Douglas posits that the
UK has several fears preventing it from approving the agreement, including “scepticism [sic]
about the practical effectiveness of the buyer's remedies provided under the convention
compared to the remedies under English law,” and “that ratification of the convention in the
United Kingdom might lead to a reduction in the number of international arbitrations coming
to England.” Id.
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See Koji Takahashi, Right to Terminate (Avoid) International Sales of Commodities,
2003 J. BUS. L. 102, 124 (2003).
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See Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Electronic Commerce, Electronic Commerce
Project (ECP)'s Ad hoc Task Force, June 6, 2001, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
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accomplish this, the ICC asks that consumers involved in an Internet contract dispute
first “make reasonable attempt[s] to utilize a company’s internal customer
satisfaction mechanisms” and then proceed to participate in mandatory online
alternative dispute resolution programs.123 Only where these methods fail to
conclude the dispute does the ICC allow for litigation in court. 124
Again, though these methods of resolving conflicts are well intended, it is likely
that the plan would be ineffective for the same reasons Galves’ proposition fails.
Additionally, the ICC does not propose the location of litigation following customer
service measures and arbitration. Parties to a suit would still be left without a
settled-upon forum under this method, and it is likely that nations would again have
to fight each other to claim personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Ultimately,
these alternative means to dispute resolution are impractical.
3. The “Notice and State Sovereignty” Approach
A final proposal offers the possibility of abrogating personal jurisdiction
considerations of purposefulness and convenience in favor of a sovereign state
approach. A. Benjamin Spencer proposes that the U.S. Constitutional reservation of
power to the states, in the absence of federal provisions to the contrary, has been lost
in the realm of personal jurisdiction and must return. 125 Spencer argues that the
procedural requirement of notice and the recognition that states have authority to
adjudicate in matters they deem to be of legitimate interest to them are of the utmost
importance in determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper.126 He finally
calls for a U.S. Supreme Court decision that reinstates these concerns as paramount
in a jurisdiction dispute.127
The theory is appealing because it embraces precedent like International Shoe128
while simply shifting courts’ focus to state interest. Yet, when applied domestically
and internationally the approach is flawed; it grants extremely broad authority,
making it nearly impossible to conceive of a situation where a state or nation would
not find a particular defendant to be within its jurisdiction. Despite claims that the
Supreme Court would not have to abrogate precedent to remain consistent, it appears
it would. One of the better-known cases deciding issues of personal jurisdiction is
Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court of California.129 This case makes clear
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2001/jurisdiction_and_applicable
_law.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2010).
123
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A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617, 672 (2006).
126
See id. Under state interest analysis, after assuring itself of the sufficiency of notice, a
court would engage in a similar, unified inquiry, asking whether the state has a legitimate
interest in the dispute such that the assertion of jurisdiction is not arbitrary and is therefore
consistent with the due process rights of the defendant. See id. at 671.
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that the burden on the defendant must be taken into consideration in determining
whether due process considerations are met. 130 Clearly, if Asahi were considered
under Spencer's approach, the State of California would be given greater deference,
its concerns presiding over those of the defendant's. Because this method would
very likely result in precedent being overruled, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would embrace this suggestion.
III. ARGUMENT
As the Internet continues to infiltrate other aspects of our daily lives, there must
be a consistent method for approaching the issues likely to emanate from its
influence. The Obama Administration has expressed a willingness to address
international e-commerce concerns through an advisory panel.131 Cameron Kerry,
Department of Commerce general counsel, and Christopher Schroeder, Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy for the United States Department of
Justice, have stated that The Interagency Subcommittee on Privacy & Internet Policy
“will develop principles and strategic directions with the goal of fostering consensus
in legislative, regulatory, and international Internet policy realm.” 132
While these suggestions have all lacked some essential requirement authorized
by case law and the U.S. Constitution, one method that would satisfy constitutional,
state, international, and party concerns would be a statutory standard for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction in e-commerce cases. This model statute could be
enacted across the United States and incorporated into its international treaties. A
practical method for putting this theory into action is to formulate a federal long-arm
statute that directly incorporates e-commerce language.
A. The Proposed Statute
The recommended provision is offered in the following terms:
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents
“A court within the United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts, directly or through an agent, to create a cause of action arising from
the person's:
a) Transacting any business in a state within the U.S.;
b) Contracting to supply services or goods in a state within the U.S.;
c) Purposefully engaging in an e-commerce transaction in a state within
the U.S. A person may be found to purposefully engage in an ecommerce transaction where:
(1) The Web site is commercial in nature;

130

See id. at 113. The Court explained that, “the determination of the reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A
court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.” Id.
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Administration Creates E-Commerce Advisory Panel, U.S. LAW WEEK (Nov. 2, 2010),
79 U.S.L.W. 1556.
132

Id.

2011]

INTERNET CONTRACTING AND E-COMMERCE

119

(2)

Contacts made by the defendant via the Internet are active in nature rather
than merely passive;
(3) A sufficient showing is made that the defendant has had minimum contacts
with a state within the U.S.;
(4) The claim against the defendant arises out of such minimum contacts;
(5) Requiring the defendant to travel to the U.S. to defend an action is
reasonable under the circumstances and does not offend fundamental
considerations of due process;
(d) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in a state within the U.S.”
B. Statutory Language and Its Meaning
Essential to this proposal is an understanding the proposed statute’s terminology.
The definitions enumerated here might also be incorporated into the Commentary
accompanying the statute itself. The following list focuses specifically on the
language involved in the e-commerce provision of this long-arm statute:
1.

“Person” includes an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, and any other type of association.” 133

2.

“Purposeful engagement” exists where an action involves the person's
conduct, or is the direct result of the person's conduct, and it is the person's
objective to engage in that conduct or to cause that result.

3.

“Commercial” includes an activity involving the sale or exchange of goods
and/or services.134

4.

“Sufficient” means adequate; of such quality, number, force, or value as is
necessary for a given purpose.135

5.

“Minimum contacts” include those connections that manifest sufficient
evidence of activity by a person in a forum state to allow that state to
adjudicate against them without offending traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.136

6.

“Active” contacts are those contacts that involve (1) directing electronic
activity into a state within the U.S., (2) with the intent of engaging in
business or other interactions within the State, and (3) where that activity
creates, in a person within the a state within the U.S., a potential cause of
action cognizable in that state’s courts. 137

133

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.381 (2010) (language from the code was adopted to fit
this provision).
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See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (3d pocket ed.1996) (definition of “commerce”).
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“Passive” contacts are those contacts that result from merely placing
information on the Internet without the intent of engaging in business or
other interactions within a state within the U.S. 138

Intrinsic in this proposed statute is the understanding that specific, not general
personal jurisdiction is the standard for requiring a defendant to litigate in a state
within the U.S. The language of the statute—“to create a cause of action arising
from [the defendant’s conduct,]”— limits a court’s ability to assert personal
jurisdiction, making it proper only where the claim emanates from a defendant’s
specific, material contact with the forum state. This measure is implemented to
protect the due process rights of a defendant who, under general personal jurisdiction
standards, might be unduly burdened by being required to litigate in a forum state
with which it had continuous contacts, but of an unsubstantial nature.
To this end, a distinctive characteristic of this proposed statute is its focus on
distinguishing “passive” Internet contacts from “active” contacts. The growing trend
among courts appears to be that mere maintenance of an Internet site or the posting
of information on a site is not enough to subject the operator of the site to personal
jurisdiction,139 but that a defendant “direct[ing] electronic activity into [a] State” with
intent to actually engage in business or other interactions in that state is sufficient
evidence to assert personal jurisdiction over him or her. 140 In making this proposed
statute applicable only to contacts that can be characterized as “active,” the
collective decisions of contemporary courts will be codified.
C. Why This Method Should Be Adopted
It is evident that the U.S. is a leader by example, with such nations as Australia
already citing its case law.141 By codifying language presently used by the judiciary,
it will hopefully be an easy transition from courthouse to legislature. This proposed
statute incorporates language from several current state long-arm statutes and
principal language from International Shoe142 and Zippo,143 two of the most
authoritative cases on personal jurisdiction law in the United States. It also focuses
138
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Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-76 (5th Cir. 2002).
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service of process in its decision in Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56
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Id. ¶ 186.
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on specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, eliminating the broad (and often
burdensome) scope that a general personal jurisdiction analysis brings.
This proposal is an improvement over other suggestions involving a major
overhaul of current procedure or stare decisis. Though it will take time and money,
the institution of a federal long-arm statute including e-commerce provisions is
likely a much simpler task than creating an entirely new forum for personal
jurisdiction dispute resolution. In short, a proposed statute incorporating ecommerce bypasses complications existent in suggestions introduced over the last
quarter of a century while still accounting for their high points: simplicity and the
consideration of due process.
Another advantage of instituting this federal long-arm statute is that it appears
not to conflict with international jurisdictional standards. Rather, it comports with
them. As previously stated, Western Europe and China each have a significant
impact upon the e-commerce market and, as such, their jurisdictional laws have
more relevancy here.
Within the European Union (EU),144 the Regulation Brussels I governs. 145
Addressing both defendants living within other Member States and those living
outside of the EU, it states that persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued
in the courts of that Member State.146 Where the matter concerns a contract dispute
between two entities within the EU, the defendant may be sued in the Member State
where the place of performance of the obligation was to take place. 147 In terms of
defendants residing outside of the EU, plaintiffs of Member States may assert
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if that defendant has a place of business or
residence within the Member State.148 Where the foreign defendant has no such
presence within the Member State, the plaintiff within the EU must apply to his or
her local court and request that jurisdiction be asserted over the foreign defendant. 149
That court will only grant permission if the plaintiff proves sufficient grounds for
asserting jurisdiction, much like the U.S.’s minimum contacts test. 150 Of course,
defendants do have a right to challenge jurisdiction similar to those brought in the
144
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U.S. in accordance with due process considerations if they deem jurisdiction to be
inappropriate or burdensome.151
China’s civil procedure laws are comparable, mandating that “[a] lawsuit
initiated over a contract dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court in
the place where the defendant has his or her domicile or where the contract is
performed.”152 The law also provides that, where a particular jurisdiction within
China, or even the nation as a whole, has a particular interest in a dispute, specific
courts within China may claim jurisdiction. 153
Comparing the laws of these collective jurisdictions shows that a federal longarm statute authorizing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
who have established minimum contacts with the U.S. is appropriate in e-commerce
cases. The principal concerns of those territories are the sufficiency of the contact
between parties arising out of the contract, fairness of process, and the interests of
the home state. These important issues are addressed with the proposed federal
long-arm statute.
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See id.
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Law of Civil Procedure (P.R.C.) (Adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh
National People's Congress on April 9, 1991, promulgated by the Order No 44 of the
President of the P.R.C.), Part One, ch. II, Section 2, art. 24. See also Part One, ch. II, Section
2, art. 25:
The parties to a contract may choose through agreement stipulated in the written
contract the people's court in the place where the defendant has his or her domicile,
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regarding jurisdiction by level and exclusive jurisdiction.
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Law;”

Art.19: “The intermediate people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over
the following civil cases:
(1). major cases involving foreign interests;
(2). cases that have major impact on the area under their jurisdiction;
and
(3). cases under the jurisdiction of the intermediate people's courts as determined by
the Supreme People's Court;”
Art. 20: “The higher people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over civil
cases that have major impact on the areas under their jurisdiction;”
Art. 21: “The Supreme People's Court shall have jurisdiction as the court of first instance over
the following civil cases:
(1). cases that have major impact on the whole country; and
(2). cases that the Supreme People's Court deems it should try.”
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IV. CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction law is an inappropriate standard in its current form to
properly service the needs of the Internet’s users. Though courts may attempt to
utilize traditional means of determining the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction,
the time has come to remove e-commerce disputes from the realm of total discretion
afforded the courts under customary tests and to create statutory provisions
adequately equipped to tackle these issues.
In adopting this statute, courts and parties to a suit will be better able to predict
the outcome of disputes, and sellers in particular will have clearer notice of the
requirements necessary to hale them into court in another jurisdiction. Referring
back to the hypothetical introduced in the Background portion of this paper (in
which S, a seller of widgets located in France, contracted electronically with B, a
buyer in the U.S.), the application of this proposed federal long-arm statute would
significantly clarify S’s chances in being required to litigate in the U.S. A U.S. court
would consider such factors as whether the website through which the transaction
took place was commercial in nature, whether S specifically advertised its products
in B’s region or merely advertised a link offering to sell the widgets, and whether
claim over the defective widgets arose out of the contacts S had with B and the U.S.
as a whole. If the evidence proves that S did meet the requirements of the proposed
statute, a final inquiry will be made as to whether S’s due process rights would be
infringed if he were required to litigate in B’s forum state. With consistent
application, this federal long-arm statute might significantly decrease questions
about personal jurisdiction for defendants like S.
Ultimately, adoption of this proposed addition of a federal long-arm statute is a
practical approach to resolving disputes over personal jurisdiction in the
international e-commerce realm.
It requires due process considerations,
incorporation of the “minimum contacts” test and concerns of “fair play and
substantial justice.”154 With this awareness, personal jurisdiction law may actually
be applied in a structured and more predictable manner.
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